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Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang: 
How Current Approaches to Guns and Domestic 
Violence Fail to Save Women’s Lives 
Jennifer L. Vainik∗ 
Steven Van Keuren and Teri Lee dated for two years before 
their relationship ended.1 On July 29th, 2006, Van Keuren 
broke into Lee’s home in Stillwater, Minnesota.2 Wielding 
butcher knives in both hands, Van Keuren attacked Lee, 
screaming that “‘the only way he could be together’ with her 
was to kill her.”3 Lee threw chairs at him as he advanced, and 
shielded herself with one to block his slashing.4 Incredibly, Lee 
managed to fend off Van Keuren, whom police later arrested at 
his home in River Falls, Wisconsin.5 
At Van Keuren’s August 1st, 2006 bail hearing, Lee told 
the judge, “I do feel physically threatened . . . . There’s no doubt 
in my mind that he will come back to my home. He’s stated . . . 
that he had nothing left to live for.”6 Despite Lee’s fears, the 
judge released Van Keuren on bail, ordering him to stay “at 
least a mile away” from Lee.7 The no-contact order did not stop 
Van Keuren from terrorizing Lee.8 On September 20th, 2006, 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002, 
Northwestern University. The author thanks Professors Beverly Balos, Dale 
Carpenter, and Stephen Cribari for their insight and guidance, the out-
standing editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review, and Sam Ives, Judi 
Vainik, and Ron Vainik for their loving support. Copyright © 2007 by Jennifer 
L. Vainik. 
 1. Sue Turner, Intruder Kills Two, Then Shot by SWAT Team, WCCO-
TV, Sept. 22, 2006, http://wcco.com/local/local_story_265092706.html. 
 2. Alex Friedrich, She Cried for Help. Did Anyone Listen?, ST. PAUL PIO-
NEER PRESS, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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Van Keuren attended Lee’s young daughter’s volleyball game.9 
Lee repeatedly notified the police, but officers never arrested 
Van Keuren for violating the order.10 
Around four o’clock in the morning on September 22nd, 
2006, Van Keuren broke into Lee’s home once again.11 Lee, her 
boyfriend, Tim Hawkinson, Sr.,12 and her four young children—
ages six to twelve—were asleep inside.13 Using a .22 caliber 
handgun, Van Keuren shot and killed Lee and Hawkinson in 
their bedroom.14 One of Lee’s daughters witnessed the murders 
before fleeing with her sister to a neighbor’s home.15 Mean-
while, Lee’s two sons hid in the home for ninety minutes until 
the police apprehended Van Keuren.16 
Sadly, days before she was killed, Lee had started the 
process of installing a security system in her home.17 The Lees 
had created an evacuation plan to be implemented if Van 
Keuren arrived at their home,18 and Hawkinson stayed over-
night to protect the family.19 Anticipating the worst, Lee im-
plored her sister to take care of her kids if Van Keuren killed 
her.20 The four Lee children are currently living with Lee’s sis-
ter and her husband, who have three children of their own.21 
This Note argues that current approaches to disarming 
batterers are ineffective and place women like Teri Lee in grave 
danger despite victims’ earnest efforts to seek protection. Part I 
explains the gendered nature of domestic violence and explores 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Turner, supra note 1. 
 12. Alex Friedrich, Couple Had Gun but Didn’t Shoot It, Spent Cartridges 
Match Ammo Found at Suspect’s Home, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 3, 
2006, at B1. 
 13. Turner, supra note 1. 
 14. Friedrich, supra note 12. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Sue Turner, Murder Victims Knew Ex-Boyfriend Would Return, 
WCCO-TV, Sept. 25, 2006, http://wcco.com/topstories/local_story_267200050 
.html. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Turner, supra note 1. 
 20. Shooting Victim’s Sister Says She Knew Life Was Threatened, MINN. 
PUB. RADIO, Sept. 24, 2006, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/ 
09/24/domestic. 
 21. Elliot Mann, Lee Children Adjust to Life After Mother’s Passing, 
STILLWATER GAZETTE (Minn.), Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.stillwatergazette 
.com/articles/2007/01/26/news/news200.txt.  
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the negative consequences of making the states primarily re-
sponsible for gun violence against women. Part II analyzes how 
recent federal attempts to correct the inadequacies of state ap-
proaches to gun violence unacceptably fail to establish a consis-
tent, national approach to disarming batterers. After examin-
ing constitutionally permissible uses of federal power to secure 
state action, Part III concludes that Congress could more effec-
tively disarm batterers by amending federal laws to include 
three new provisions. Specifically, federal law should provide 
monetary incentives to the states to enact the federal gun bans 
as state statutes, fund the creation of locally operated gun units 
for the purposes of identifying and disarming batterers, and re-
quire states to report information about batterers to federal law 
enforcement authorities. 
I.  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, GUNS, AND GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSIBILITY   
Tragically, the terror the Lee family experienced cannot be 
characterized as an anomaly. Women routinely experience vio-
lence at the hands of their intimate partners.22 Any solution to 
domestic violence must take into account how abuse affects 
women and men differently, as well as the government’s role in 
both ameliorating and perpetuating the disproportionate effects 
of domestic violence on women and men. 
A. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DEFINED 
The American Medical Association defines domestic vio-
lence as “the physical, sexual, and/or psychological abuse to an 
individual perpetrated by a current or former intimate part-
ner.”23 Alternatively referred to as “wife battering” or “intimate 
partner abuse,” domestic violence describes a pattern of control 
that becomes more dangerous with time,24 because batterers 
 
 22. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Women Face Greatest Threat of Violence at 
Home, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A7 (“Violence against women 
by their live-in spouses or partners is a widespread phenomenon, both in the 
developed and the developing world . . . .”); see also Bob Herbert, Why Aren’t 
We Shocked?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at A19 (“The disrespectful, degrading, 
contemptuous treatment of women is so pervasive and so mainstream that it 
has just about lost its ability to shock.”). 
 23. Michael A. Rodriguez et al., Screening and Intervention for Intimate 
Partner Abuse: Practices and Attitudes of Primary Care Physicians, 282 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 468, 468 (1999). 
 24. Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of Domestic Violence Firearms Bans, 14 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2005). 
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display high rates of recidivism and because the severity of the 
abuse tends to intensify.25 Thus, once physical or psychological 
intimidation begins it usually escalates, becoming more fre-
quent and severe.26 
While the term “domestic violence” connotes gender neu-
trality,27 statistics show that domestic violence affects men and 
women in vastly different ways.28 The U.S. Department of Jus-
tice reports that eighty-five percent of victims of intimate-
partner domestic violence are women.29 Furthermore, 63.5% of 
female homicide victims are killed by intimate partners, as 
compared to 36.5% of male homicide victims.30 Most violence 
that men experience occurs in public spaces, committed by 
male acquaintances or male strangers.31 In stark contrast, 
women are most likely to encounter violence in their own 
homes,32 perpetrated not by strangers, but by men whom the 
women intimately know and love.33 These men are often 
women’s long-term partners and the fathers of their children.34 
B. WHEN BATTERERS POSSESS GUNS 
While all forms of domestic violence are potentially lethal, 
 
 25. Id. at 3–4. 
 26. See id. at 4 (“Without active police or court intervention, recurrence 
and intensification of the abuse are even more certain.”). 
 27. See Rodriguez et al., supra note 23, at 468. 
 28. See Susan B. Sorenson, Firearm Use in Intimate Partner Violence: A 
Brief Overview, 30 EVALUATION REV. 229, 229 (2006) (noting that two primary 
differences between the homicides of men and women are the place of the 
homicide and the nature of the victim-suspect relationship). 
 29. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE 1993–2001, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf; see also Lauren E. Crais, Domestic Violence and the Federal 
Government, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 405, 406 (2005) (“[M]ore than 960,000 in-
cidents of domestic violence occur each year, and about eighty-five percent of 
the victims are women.”). 
 30. JAMES ALAN FOX & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/pub/pdf/htius.pdf. 
 31. Sorenson, supra note 28, at 229. 
 32. See id. at 230 (“In recent years, intimate partner homicides composed 
only 4% of the murders of men but about one third of the murders of women.”); 
see also Rosenthal, supra note 22 (citing a 2006 study by the World Health Or-
ganization which found that at six research sites around the world at least 
fifty percent of women were subject to moderate or severe violence in the 
home). 
 33. See Sorenson, supra note 28, at 230. 
 34. See id. (noting that women’s abusers are often their intimate partners, 
whether boyfriends or husbands). 
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studies show that guns and domestic violence are a particularly 
deadly combination.35 The Department of Justice reports that 
nationwide, two-thirds of intimate-partner homicide victims 
are killed by guns.36 If a batterer possesses a firearm the likeli-
hood that he will murder his girlfriend or wife increases sub-
stantially.37 Intimate assaults involving firearms are twelve 
times more likely to end in fatality than assaults not associated 
with firearms.38 
Even when batterers do not actually fire their guns, they 
still use guns to control women.39 Abused women frequently re-
port that their intimate partners brandish guns to threaten 
deadly force.40 In the face of such threats, women are more 
likely to endure long-term abuse out of fear that leaving the re-
lationship will result in their death or the death of their chil-
dren.41 
 
 35. Amy Karan & Helen Stampalia, Domestic Violence and Firearms: A 
Deadly Combination, FLA. BAR J., Oct. 2005, at 79, 79 (2005); see also May, 
supra note 24, at 4 (“If firearms remain in a household with a history of do-
mestic violence, the risk of death or firearm injury to the victim increases 
dramatically.”); Emily J. Sack, Confronting the Issue of Gun Seizure in Domes-
tic Violence Cases, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 3, 3 (2005) (noting 
that (1) firearms caused 44% of the 61 homicides related to domestic violence 
in San Diego County between 1997 and 2003; (2) in the late 1990s the New 
York State Commission on Domestic Violence Fatalities concluded that fire-
arms were used in more than half of the domestic violence homicides it inves-
tigated; and (3) in Washington State, 60% of the 209 victims of domestic vio-
lence homicides from January 1997 to August 2002 were killed with a 
firearm).  
 36. Karan & Stampalia, supra note 35, at 79; May, supra note 24, at 4; 
Sack, supra note 35, at 3. 
 37. See May, supra note 24, at 4 (“Battered women are approximately five 
times more likely than other women to be murdered in a shooting . . . .”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Casey Gwinn, Domestic Violence and Firearms: Reflections of a Prose-
cutor, 30 EVALUATION REV. 237, 239 (2006) (“[O]ffenders use . . . guns to in-
timidate and threaten their female victims even if they never shoot. In fact, 
the most common use of a firearm in the home of a batterer may well be to 
threaten the female victim.”); Sorenson, supra note 28, at 235 (“Firearms are 
used in ways that do not result in firearm-related injuries. A gun can be used 
to coerce behaviors such as sex, as a means to inflict terror, and so on.”). 
 40. See Gwinn, supra note 39, at 239; Sorenson, supra note 28, at 235 
(speculating that handguns may be more common in homes where battering 
occurs than in the general population). 
 41. See Gwinn, supra note 39, at 239 (observing that an abuser’s threats 
to “use his firearm on her, on the children and on himself” convinced the vic-
tim to stay in the abusive relationship); Karan & Stampalia, supra note 35, at 
79 (noting that the domestic violence perpetrator “threatened to kill [his vic-
tim] every time she tried to leave him”). 
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C. GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
AND GUNS 
1. Understanding the State Sovereignty Paradigm 
In order to determine the best strategy to prevent gun vio-
lence against women, policymakers should consider how the 
doctrine of federalism apportions government responsibility for 
this issue. Historically, states have been responsible for ad-
dressing domestic relations. As the Supreme Court stated in In 
re Burrus, “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of hus-
band and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the 
[s]tates and not to the laws of the United States.”42 Federalism 
doctrine favors state power over domestic relations for two rea-
sons.43 First, the Tenth Amendment preserves the states’ tradi-
tional power to regulate the family.44 Second, as smaller politi-
cal units, the states are more “in tune” with local mores.45 As a 
result, the states can best enact laws that shape domestic rela-
tions to reflect the values of their constituents. The states’ pre-
sumptive legislative and adjudicative authority over domestic 
relations is known as the state sovereignty paradigm.46 
United States v. Morrison47 provides a modern example of 
federalism’s preference for state control of domestic relations. 
In Morrison, the Court declared unconstitutional a provision of 
the Violence Against Women Act that allowed victims of vio-
lence to sue their abusers for civil remedies in federal courts.48 
In so doing, the Court limited the federal government’s ability 
to offer a national solution to domestic violence. Morrison held 
that if Congress could regulate domestic violence through the 
Commerce Clause, the distinction between what is “local” and 
what is “national” would be “negatively blurred.”49 The Court 
characterized domestic relations—including the violence that 
 
 42. 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890). 
 43. See Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of 
Federal Family Law and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1761, 1763–64 (2005). 
 44. See Collins, supra note 43, at 1764. 
 45. See Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
197, 199 (1999) (“Regulation of the family, the thinking goes, is better-suited to 
the states because states are the locus of community dialogues on questions of 
values.”); Collins, supra note 43, at 1764. 
 46. See Collins supra note 43, at 1770–71. 
 47. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 48. Id. at 627. 
 49. Id. at 617–18. 
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may accompany those relations—as a “local matter” best re-
solved by the states, rather than a national civil rights problem 
necessitating a federal remedy.50 
However, the states’ power to control domestic relations is 
not absolute. Constitutional protections limit the state sover-
eignty paradigm, including the right of privacy protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.51 The Court first recognized a right of 
privacy in marital relationships in Griswold v. Connecticut, as-
serting that the State cannot enter “the sacred precincts of 
marital bedrooms.”52 The Court extended the right of privacy to 
individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird,53 and reaffirmed the right in 
Roe v. Wade.54 In Roe, the Court noted that precedent extends 
the right of privacy to “activities relating to marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and 
education.”55 While domestic relations fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the states, constitutional privacy rights limit the extent 
to which states may regulate such relationships. 
Courts’ reluctance to permit government intervention in 
the home—even when the home is the site of extreme vio-
lence—evidences the significance of privacy rights within the 
home. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services, the Court held that state authorities had no affirma-
tive responsibility to protect a toddler from his abusive father.56 
County social workers were aware of the child abuse, but took 
no action to remove the boy from his father’s custody.57 The 
boy’s father subsequently beat him so severely that he suffered 
 
 50. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United 
States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 138 (2000) (contending that if the 
Violence Against Women Act had been upheld, it would have “[l]ocat[ed] acts 
of gender-based violence under the rubric of civil rights”). 
 51. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 52. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 53. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1971) (“If the right to privacy means anything, it is 
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion . . . .”). 
 54. 410 U.S. at 152 (“In a line of decisions . . . the Court has recognized 
that a right of personal privacy . . . does exist under the Constitution.” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
 55. Id. at 152–53 (citations omitted). 
 56. 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (“[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due 
Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, 
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property inter-
ests . . . .”). 
 57. Id. at 192–93. 
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permanent brain injuries.58 The Court asserted that while the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from the state, it does 
not protect citizens from each other.59 Consequently, the State 
had no responsibility to protect the boy from his violent fa-
ther.60 Furthermore, the state authorities’ knowledge of the 
abuse did not rise to the level of “state action” that necessitates 
constitutional protection.61 
Together, the privacy cases and DeShaney suggest that 
while the Constitution limits a state’s ability to regulate pri-
vate relationships, it does not require that a state intervene 
when such relationships are violent. Town of Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales62 demonstrates the impact of this interpretation of 
the scope of state authority. In this case, Jessica Gonzales’s ex-
husband took their three young daughters from their home 
while they were playing outside, despite the fact that a re-
straining order prohibited him from seeing the family unless he 
arranged a visit.63 Jessica repeatedly called the police and even 
went to the police station, but the officers did not locate and re-
turn her children.64 Later, Mr. Gonzales shot the three children 
to death.65 Jessica filed a claim, stating that the police violated 
her property interest in the enforcement of her restraining or-
der.66 Justice Scalia rejected her argument, stating, “[w]e do 
not believe that these provisions of Colorado law truly made en-
forcement of the restraining orders mandatory,”67 and reason-
ing that “[t]he procedural component of the Due Process Clause 
does not protect everything that might be described as a ‘bene-
fit.’”68 According to Gonzales, even a specific legislative man-
date to enforce restraining orders does not compel state au-
 
 58. Id. at 193. 
 59. Id. at 196 (“Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
affords protection against unwarranted government interference . . . , it does 
not confer an entitlement to such [government aid] as may be necessary to re-
alize all the advantages of that freedom.” (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 317–18 (1980))). 
 60. Id. at 197 (“[A] State’s failure to protect an individual against private 
violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”). 
 61. Id. at 199–200 (contending that “state action” occurs when a state 
takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will). 
 62. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 63. Id. at 751. 
 64. Id. at 753–54. 
 65. Id. at 754. 
 66. Id. at 748. 
 67. Id. at 760. 
 68. Id. at 756. 
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thorities to intervene in domestic relations.69 
The extent of the states’ power to regulate domestic rela-
tions affects women and men differently. This disparity stems 
from the belief that the “public” sphere of industry, commerce 
and government is distinctly separate from the “private” sphere 
of the home.70 In addition, the public and private spheres are 
gendered.71 Historically, women have been associated with the 
home since women traditionally undertook homemaking and 
childbearing responsibilities.72 In contrast, the public sphere is 
usually portrayed as “masculine,” since men traditionally acted 
as breadwinners and authority figures in the public domain.73 
The gender inequality inherent in the traditional construc-
tion of the public and private spheres affects the degree to 
which the government can intervene in domestic affairs and, 
consequently, domestic violence.74 Both the federal and state 
governments may regulate the commercial, contractual, and 
governmental transactions that occur in the (male) public 
sphere.75 In contrast, the state sovereignty paradigm rejects 
the possibility of federal intervention in the home76 and the 
Constitution limits the extent of state regulation of the home.77 
Consequently, the state sovereignty paradigm renders women 
unprotected in the private sphere of the home.78 By guarding 
 
 69. See id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that 
the Colorado law at issue in Gonzales required police to enforce restraining 
orders in an effort to correct the historical problem of police inaction in the 
face of domestic disputes. Id. at 775–76. 
 70. KRISTIN A. KELLY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PRI-
VACY 5 (2003). 
 71. Id. at 33. 
 72. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., 
concurring) (“The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in 
the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic 
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of woman-
hood.”); KELLY, supra note 70, at 33. 
 73. See KELLY, supra note 70, at 33. 
 74. See Adler, supra note 45, at 256 (“[U]nderlying federal denial of the 
responsibility for family law are subliminal associations of federal law with 
masculinity, rights, market norms, individualist self-reliance, objectivity, and 
the public sphere; and state law with femininity, love, values, altruism, sub-
jectivity, and the private sphere.”). 
 75. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (describing the 
ability of the federal government to regulate economic activity that affects in-
terstate commerce). 
 76. See, e.g., id. at 613–16; In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890). 
 77. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
 78. See KELLY, supra note 70, at 34 (describing how “the designation of 
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the home’s privacy, the government casts a blind eye on the 
power imbalance between domestic partners.79 In effect, the 
State becomes the guardian of the notion that “a man’s home is 
his castle.” 
2. Historic State Approaches to Domestic Violence 
In addition to designating states as responsible for domes-
tic relations, federalism doctrine also conceives of the states as 
“laboratories” that test different legal “experiments.”80 While 
some experiments will fail, others will succeed and serve as an 
example for the rest of the country.81 In their role as laborato-
ries, the states have historically devised a variety of approaches 
to domestic violence. While some states prevented violence 
against women,82 others condoned it.83 
The earliest response to domestic violence in the United 
States involved steps the colonies took to criminalize the behav-
ior.84 In 1641, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties stated that 
“[e]verie marryed woeman shall be free from bodilie correction 
or stripes by her husband, unlesse it be in his owne defence 
upon her assault.”85 The Governor’s Council of Massachusetts 
granted to at least nine battered women a legal separation with 
no right to remarry.86 Similarly, the Plymouth Colony permit-
 
women as belonging to the private sphere” creates problems with domestic vio-
lence). 
 79. See id. (“[A] noninterventionist approach to domestic life has func-
tioned to protect the privacy of men at the expense of the safety of women.”). 
 80. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging the states’ role as “laboratories”); Wayne A. Logan, Creating a 
“Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 65, 84 & n.111 (2006) (recognizing that one of federalism’s core 
values is the “ideal of democratic experimentalism and pluralism” wherein 
states may “undertake ‘experiments without risk to the rest of the country’” 
(quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting))). 
 81. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Balance of Power Between the Federal 
Government and the States, in NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS 111, 117–18 (Alan 
Brinkley et al. eds., 1997). 
 82. See Elizabeth Felter, A History of the State’s Response to Domestic Vio-
lence, in FEMINISTS NEGOTIATE THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE 5, 8–10 (Cynthia R. Daniels ed., 1997). 
 83. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 157–58 (1824). 
 84. See Felter, supra note 82, at 8–9. 
 85. Id. at 9 (quoting ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING 
OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT 21–22 (1987)). 
 86. Id. 
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ted one battered woman to live separately from her husband, 
who was required to pay maintenance to her until he was “re-
formed.”87 
While some states criminalized domestic violence, others 
reinforced it as a permissible component of marriage. For ex-
ample, in Bradley v. State, the court found that a husband may 
“chastise” his wife so long as his “correction” is “reasonable.”88 
Other courts justified this “right” on the basis of a man’s ability 
to act freely within the privacy of his home. In State v. Black, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that unless “perma-
nent injury or excessive violence” was involved, the law would 
“not invade the domestic forum, or go behind the curtain.”89 
Similarly, the court in State v. Rhodes observed that “family 
government is recognized by law as being as complete in itself 
as the [s]tate government is in itself . . . . Every household has 
and must have, a government of its own, modelled to suit the 
temper . . . of its inmates.”90 These opinions suggest that states’ 
reluctance to aid battered women derived from an assumption 
that domestic affairs were beyond the reach of the states’ juris-
diction.91 
3. Current State Approaches to Domestic Violence 
Modern state law continues to reflect the historical dis-
unity of the states’ stances toward domestic violence.92 An ex-
amination of state laws regarding gun ownership and domestic 
violence illustrates the diversity of actions—as well as non-
action—states currently take to prevent gun violence against 
women. Two mechanisms that states often use to disarm bat-
 
 87. Id. 
 88. 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 157–58 (1824). 
 89. 60 N.C. (Win.) 262, 263–64 (1824), overruled by State v. Oliver, 70 
N.C. 60 (1874), as recognized in Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 
515 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 1999). 
 90. 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453, 456–57 (1868), overruled by Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, as 
recognized in Virmani, 515 S.E.2d 675. 
 91. See, e.g., Bradley, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) at 158 (“Family broils and dis-
sentions cannot be investigated before the tribunals of the country, without 
casting a shade over the character of those who are unfortunately engaged in 
the controversy.”); Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) at 456–57 (“[W]e will not interfere 
with or attempt to control [the family government], in favor of either husband 
or wife . . . .”). 
 92. See Anne Rousseve, Domestic Violence and the States, 6 GEO. J. GEN-
DER & L. 431, 432 (2005) (“Because there is no uniform codification of criminal 
domestic violence on a national level, states vary significantly in their statu-
tory organization of criminal domestic violence law.”). 
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terers include allowing state courts to order firearm removal at 
order for protection hearings and permitting police officers to 
seize weapons when they respond to a domestic violence inci-
dent.93 
Despite the danger guns pose to women nationwide, just 
sixteen states allow their courts to disarm batterers at order for 
protection hearings.94 Among these states, court approaches to 
gun removal vary radically.95 For example, nine of the sixteen 
states give judges discretion in deciding whether to include a 
gun removal provision in the order.96 Furthermore, only two 
states, North Carolina and California, require judges to notify 
the parties that the respondent cannot possess firearms while 
under the order.97 In other states, many victims may be un-
aware of the gun ban and therefore unlikely to notify the judge 
that the respondent must be disarmed.98 In addition, some 
states make weapon removal contingent on the actual use or 
threatened use of a weapon in a domestic violence incident.99 
States also vary on how to physically take away the guns pur-
suant to an order of protection. Five states authorize law en-
forcement to seize the guns.100 However, eleven states depend 
on the abusers themselves to surrender their firearms.101 
Like the laws governing court-ordered disarmament, those 
concerning police removal are anything but uniform. Eighteen 
states authorize police officers to confiscate firearms at the 
 
 93. See Shannon Frattaroli & Jon S. Vernick, Separating Batterers and 
Guns: A Review and Analysis of Gun Removal Laws in 50 States, 30 EVALUA-
TION REV. 296, 297 (2006). 
 94. See id. at 299. 
 95. See Sack, supra note 35, at 10 (noting that state gun bans “vary tre-
mendously”). 
 96. Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 307. 
 97. See id. at 308. (“California law requires courts to verbally inform both 
parties in the proceedings that the respondent cannot possess firearms while 
the order is in effect. . . . [I]n North Carolina, judges must ask if respondents 
have access to firearms.”). 
 98. See Karan & Stampalia, supra note 35, at 79 (“Many people are un-
aware of a 1996 federal law that prohibits a person with a qualifying misde-
meanor domestic violence conviction from possessing . . . a firearm or ammuni-
tion . . . .”); Judy Harrison, Domestic Abuse Targeted by Gun Laws, BANGOR 
DAILY NEWS (Me.), June 29, 2004, at B1 (positing that many people affected by 
federal gun bans might have no idea the laws exist). 
 99. See Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 307 (listing Arkansas, Illi-
nois, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania). 
 100. Id. at 307–08 (listing Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, and New Jersey). 
 101. Id. at 308. 
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scene of a domestic violence incident.102 While some states re-
quire the police to confiscate firearms, others simply permit 
removal.103 In addition, some states only allow police to take 
guns if the accused abuser is arrested.104 Also, while some 
states impose a blanket requirement that the police take “all 
firearms” in the suspect’s possession,105 others only allow offi-
cers to take guns in “plain view” or discovered through a “con-
sensual search.”106 A few states further limit the requirement 
to only those firearms involved in the “incident at hand.”107 
Even when the police are actually able to confiscate a weapon, 
some states stipulate that the gun can only be held for a brief 
period of time.108 Due to the inconsistencies and shortcomings 
of state approaches to disarming batterers, recent federal legis-
lation has attempted to address the issues of guns and domestic 
violence. 
4. Federal Approaches to Domestic Violence and Guns 
While the states have addressed domestic violence since 
the founding of the American colonies,109 the federal govern-
ment has only recently acted to protect battered women. It was 
not until the late 1970s that Congress first introduced two na-
tional domestic violence bills, both of which were defeated.110 
The first federal law on domestic violence is only thirteen years 
old—the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA).111 This 
 
 102. Id. at 299. 
 103. See id. at 299, 306 (observing that eight states require police to re-
move firearms, seven states permit police to remove firearms, and three states 
have ambiguous statutory language). 
 104. See id. at 306. 
 105. See id. (“Police gun removal laws apply to all firearms owned or pos-
sessed by the alleged batterer in nine states, provided other criteria . . . are 
met.”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. at 307 (“Six states . . . limit removal authority to firearms ac-
tually involved in the domestic violence incident.”); Sack, supra note 35, at 11 
(listing Montana and Ohio as examples of states that only allow police to seize 
guns that have been used or threatened to be used in the assault). 
 108. See Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 307 (stating that the re-
moval period is seven days or less in many states and that eight states do not 
provide a specific time frame for return of the seized guns). 
 109. See Felter, supra note 82, at 8–9. 
 110. See Rachelle Brooks, Feminists Negotiate the Legislative Branch: The 
Violence Against Women Act, in FEMINISTS NEGOTIATE THE STATE: THE POLI-
TICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 82, at 65, 68. 
 111. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2261 (LexisNexis 2006); see also Brooks, supra note 110, 
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landmark piece of legislation created federal causes of action 
for domestic violence victims and appropriated billions of dol-
lars for battered women’s shelters and other resources.112 
VAWA also attempted to overcome the shortcomings of state 
gun laws by instituting federal measures to protect women 
from gun violence.113 
As part of VAWA, Congress passed two notable provisions 
amending the Gun Control Act of 1968.114 The first, entitled the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, pro-
hibits individuals subject to an order for protection from pur-
chasing or possessing a firearm.115 The second, the Lautenberg 
Amendment of 1996, declares that anyone convicted of a do-
mestic violence misdemeanor cannot possess or purchase a 
firearm or ammunition.116 In the words of the late U.S. Senator 
Paul Wellstone, the laws sought to recognize that the “only dif-
ference between a battered woman and a dead woman is the 
presence of a gun.”117 In so doing, the laws attempted to protect 
women and children by establishing a national commitment to 
disarm batterers.118 
While the federal gun bans were controversial from the 
outset, the capacity of the laws to accomplish their goals came 
under heavy scrutiny after Morrison. In light of Morrison’s re-
 
at 76–78 (describing VAWA’s passage and its relevant provisions). 
 112. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2261; Brooks, supra note 110, at 65, 76–77 (arguing 
that VAWA was “the most significant piece of legislation ever enacted on the 
subject of domestic violence against women” in the United States). 
 113. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2261; Michelle W. Easterling, For Better or Worse: 
The Federalization of Domestic Violence, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 940 (1996) 
(“Congress . . . was apparently convinced that the states were not solving the 
domestic violence problem, and that the federal government’s involvement was 
needed.”); Editorial, Why Give Wife-Beaters Guns?, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1996, 
at A24 (referring to the need for legislation to “plug a potentially deadly gap” 
since no state then banned “the possession of a gun by those convicted of mis-
demeanor domestic-violence crimes”). 
 114. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). 
 115. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110401, 108 Stat. 2014, 2014–15 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000)). 
 116. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 658, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-371 to -372 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000)).  
 117. 142 CONG. REC. S10378 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Wellstone). 
 118. See id. (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (“The amendment . . . would . . . 
send a message about our [n]ation’s commitment to ending domestic violence 
and about our determination to protect the millions of women and children 
who suffer from this abuse.”). 
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iteration of the state sovereignty paradigm, many legal schol-
ars predicted that federal judges would overturn the gun 
bans.119 Scholars expected that judges would “characterize [fed-
eral domestic violence statutes] as ‘family law’ statutes and 
then point to the warning language in Morrison . . . as evidence 
of the statutes’ unconstitutionality.”120 Just as Morrison invali-
dated federal civil remedies for domestic violence, scholars pre-
dicted that courts would also overrule the gun bans since they 
similarly mandated federal intervention in matters of “local 
concern,” including the family, gun control, and criminal law.121 
As legal scholars expected, courts considered numerous 
constitutional objections to the gun provisions.122 Nevertheless, 
courts repeatedly declared the federal gun bans constitu-
tional.123 Notably, courts upheld the laws during a period of leg-
islative and judicial relaxation of other gun control laws.124 Yet 
although the gun laws were upheld, they have not proven to be 
 
 119. See Elizabeth S. Saylor, Federalism and the Family After Morrison: 
An Examination of the Child Support Recovery Act, the Freedom of Access to 
Clinic Entrances Act, and a Federal Law Outlawing Gun Possession by Domes-
tic Violence Abusers, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 137 (2002) (“If any of the re-
maining gun possession laws are subject to attack, the Lautenberg Amend-
ment and [the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994] are 
perfect targets because they combine two core areas of supposed traditional 
state concern: family and criminal law.”). 
 120. Id. at 60. 
 121. See id. at 137–40. 
 122. See United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 2000) (reject-
ing a due process challenge to the Lautenberg Amendment); Gillespie v. City 
of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 698, 704–05 (7th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the 
Lautenberg Amendment from the Gun-Free School Zones Act struck down in 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), since the Lautenberg Amendment 
contained a jurisdictional hook); United States v. Bunnell, 106 F. Supp. 2d 60, 
65 (D. Me. 2000) (finding that the Lautenberg Amendment has “both a specific 
jurisdictional element as well as a substantial effect on interstate commerce” 
and therefore is a “constitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Com-
merce Clause”); see also T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FIREARMS 
PROHIBITIONS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONVICTIONS: THE LAUTENBERG 
AMENDMENT 5–9 (2001), available at http://www.peaceathomeshelter 
.org/DV/readings/federal/lautenberg.pdf (summarizing.commerce clause, equal 
protection clause, and ex post facto clause challenges to the Lautenberg 
Amendment). 
 123. See Jessica A. Golden, Examining the Lautenberg Amendment in the 
Civilian and Military Contexts: Congressional Overreaching, Statutory Vague-
ness, Ex Post Facto Violations, and Implementational Flaws, 29 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 427, 442 (2001). 
 124. See May, supra note 24, at 27 (“Thirty-six states currently allow their 
citizens to carry concealed weapons, and at least five of those states passed 
their laws [between 2004 and 2005].”). 
VAINIK_3FMT 4/16/2007 8:53:54 AM 
1126 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1111 
 
a successful means of addressing gun violence against women. 
II.  THE FEDERAL GUN BANS IMPLICITLY ACCEPT THE 
FLAWED STATE SOVEREIGNTY PARADIGM   
A. STATE AND FEDERAL GUN BANS ARE INEFFECTIVE 
Recent federal and state actions to disarm batterers are 
not saving women’s lives.125 Surprisingly, men appear to be ex-
periencing the greatest benefit from recent domestic violence 
policies.126 Since the 1970s, the number of men killed by their 
intimate partners decreased substantially while the number of 
women murdered in domestic violence incidents did not de-
cline.127 Recent changes that make it easier for women to es-
cape violent relationships, such as the liberal issuance of re-
straining orders,128 increased recognition of no-fault divorce,129 
and the proliferation of battered women’s shelters,130 likely ac-
count for the reduction in female-perpetrated homicides against 
intimate partners. 
Major flaws in federal and state approaches to disarming 
batterers cause women to continue to face deadly violence. At 
the state level, laws banning gun ownership by batterers are 
either non-existent or difficult to enforce. Overall, twenty-six 
states currently have no laws ordering batterers to disarm.131 
In states that do have such laws, conditions and qualifications 
 
 125. See Sorenson, supra note 28, at 231 (“[I]n the past generation, the 
phenomenon of intimate partner homicide has changed to be largely the homi-
cide of women.” (emphasis added)). 
 126. See id. (“An increasing female-to-male ratio of intimate partner homi-
cide is observed for both [b]lacks (0.84 in 1976 to 2.25 in 1999) and [w]hites 
(1.72 in 1976 to 3.60 in 1999).”). 
 127. See id. (“[F]ewer and fewer men were killed by their intimate partners 
during the past several decades [1976–2002], but the number of women, par-
ticularly [w]hite women, killed changed relatively little. . . . In 1976, there 
were 1.17 female victims for every male victim of intimate partner homicide; 
in 2002, there were 3.02 female victims for every male victim.”). 
 128. Clare Dalton & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women and the Law 
498 (2001). 
 129. Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: 
The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Re-
production, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 305, 325 (2006). 
 130. Archana Nath, Note, Survival or Suffocation: Can Minnesota’s New 
Strangulation Law Overcome Implicit Biases in the Justice System?, 25 Law & 
Ineq. 253, 262 & n.64  (2007). 
 131. See Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 299 (stating the law as of 
April 2004). 
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reduce the likelihood of disarming batterers. For instance, a 
judge might decide that the gun removal provision “is not im-
portant” and refuse to impose the ban.132 If the batterer did not 
use the gun in the domestic violence incident, he might legally 
be able to continue to possess guns or purchase new ones.133 In 
many cases, the batterer may only be disarmed for a couple 
days,134 and, in states where the abuser must turn in his guns, 
he might simply refuse to comply.135 
Even if states can legally disarm a batterer, many states 
lack the bureaucratic and physical infrastructure to actually 
remove the guns. Many states do not have gun repositories 
where the guns can be stored.136 Nor do they have the extra law 
enforcement officers necessary to confiscate the weapons, cata-
logue them, store them in the repository and return them once 
an order for protection terminates or a misdemeanant’s record 
is expunged.137 Some states have no system in place to inform 
victims, abusers, employers and police officers of the gun 
bans.138 Other states do not have a common database wherein 
they may flag the abuser as a “prohibited person.”139 Thus, gun 
 
 132. See Thomas B. Cole, Disarming Violent Domestic Abusers Is Key to 
Saving Lives, Say Experts, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 557, 557 (2004) (“Some 
judges may be reluctant to deal with the gun issue . . . .”); May, supra note 24, 
at 22–28 (noting instances wherein local judges did not enforce the gun bans); 
Sack, supra note 35, at 21 (“The intersection of domestic violence and firearm 
possession . . . appears to be one in which significant confusion or resistance 
remains on the part of judges.”). 
 133. See Cole, supra note 132, at 557 (“[T]he laws may not support taking 
the guns away from abusive partners . . . .”); see also Frattaroli & Vernick, su-
pra note 93, at 306. 
 134. See Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 307. 
 135. See Cole, supra note 132, at 557 (noting that if abusers do not tell the 
police or the judge that they have guns, law enforcement officers may not at-
tempt to remove the guns); Sack, supra note 35, at 18 (“After an order to sur-
render firearms is issued, often little follow-up is done to determine whether 
the weapons were actually relinquished.”). 
 136. See Sack, supra note 35, at 8 (“[T]he federal government provided no 
additional resources to the states to help them carry out their role in enforcing 
federal law.”). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See Karan & Stampalia, supra note 35, at 80 (“[M]any people are un-
aware of a 1996 federal law that prohibits a person with a qualifying misde-
meanor domestic violence conviction from possessing . . . a firearm or ammuni-
tion . . . .”); Harrison, supra note 98; Matthew A. Radefeld, Ever Heard of the 
Lautenberg Amendment? You’re Not Alone, KAN. CITY DAILY REC., Nov. 5, 
2005, at 3 (noting that many criminal defense attorneys have never heard of 
the Lautenberg Amendment). 
 139. See BRADY CAMPAIGN, DISARMING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ABUSERS: 
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dealers and police may not know whether an individual can or 
cannot possess or purchase a gun. 
While the federal disarmament laws were enacted to ame-
liorate the inadequacies of the state laws, the federal gun bans 
also fail to achieve their goal. The federal bans are severely un-
der enforced, enabling batterers to continue to possess guns. 
From 2000 to 2002, 630 suspects were referred to U.S. Attor-
neys for violations of a firearms-related domestic offense, rep-
resenting just three percent of the 18,653 federal suspects re-
ferred for alleged violent crimes.140 This is a small fraction of 
the number of cases that can be prosecuted. Judge Posner of 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit estimates that ap-
proximately forty thousand people violate the gun bans each 
year by possessing firearms while subject to a protection or-
der.141 A smaller percentage of suspects are convicted.142 The 
federal time and money spent on enforcing weapons offenses is 
not commensurate to the scope of the problem. 
The circumstances that inhibit state and federal authori-
ties from disarming batterers place women in grave danger. 
The point at which women seek legal intervention to stop 
abuse, either by calling the police or obtaining an order for pro-
tection, is often a very risky moment.143 Faced with the possi-
bility of legal sanctions or a loss of power over their partner, 
some abusers, like Steven Van Keuren, reassert their control 
through deadly force.144 If a batterer is neither disarmed by the 
State nor likely to face federal criminal penalties, he will con-
tinue to access guns. The laws simply do not impede gun vio-
lence against women at the critical point when women most 
need the laws’ protection. 
The inability of federal and state firearm bans to disarm 
 
STATES SHOULD CLOSE LEGISLATIVE LOOPHOLES THAT ENABLE DOMESTIC 
ABUSERS TO PURCHASE AND POSSESS FIREARMS 7–8 (2003), http:// 
www.bradycampaign.org/pdf/facts/reports/domestic_violence.pdf (noting that 
many states do not provide information about domestic misdemeanor convic-
tions to the National Instant Check System or other databases). 
 140. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIO-
LENCE STATISTICS: INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTAN-
CES 51 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf. 
 141. Sack, supra note 35, at 8. 
 142. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 140, at 52 (“Of . . . 52 defendants, 47 
(90.4%) were convicted of interstate domestic violence . . . . Of these 47, 37 de-
fendants pleaded guilty (79%), and 10 defendants were convicted at trial 
(21%). Five cases were dismissed.”). 
 143. See May, supra note 24, at 28–29. 
 144. See supra text accompanying notes 1–21. 
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abusers deserves further inquiry. Despite the constitutional va-
lidity of the laws and the tremendous need to protect women’s 
safety, why are current approaches to gun violence and domes-
tic abuse ineffective? A critical examination of the laws reveals 
that continued reliance on the state sovereignty paradigm im-
pedes the ability of the federal government to fully protect 
women. Furthermore, ineffective federal action deters progres-
sive state efforts to save women’s lives. As a result, neither the 
federal nor state governments properly address gun violence 
and domestic abuse. Instead, domestic violence is once again 
relegated to a “private” sphere beyond the reach of government 
actors. Consequently, women like Teri Lee are left with no al-
ternative but to rely on themselves for protection.145  
B. THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY PARADIGM IMPERMISSIBLY FAILS 
TO PROTECT WOMEN 
An analysis of how federalism doctrine appropriates gov-
ernment responsibility for domestic relations demonstrates 
why current approaches to gun violence against women fail.146 
The state sovereignty paradigm is not simply a legitimate, neu-
tral idea essential to the operation of federalism. Instead, his-
tory shows that legislatures and courts have strategically ma-
nipulated the paradigm to accomplish specific political goals.147 
Legislatures and courts argue that the federal government has 
little power over domestic relations and in so doing, reinforce 
women’s social, economic and political subordination. 
Historically, the state sovereignty paradigm did not deter 
federal action in domestic relations to the extent that it does 
today. Instead, history shows that the federal government ac-
tively regulated family life during the pre-Civil War era.148 Act-
ing on the belief that a woman’s care-giving activities promoted 
the development of a productive citizenry, Congress instituted 
programs that supported women and children, including the 
creation of widows’ war pensions,149 The legislative record 
 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 1–21. 
 146. See Adler, supra note 45, at 201 (“Understanding the relationship be-
tween federalism and family has the potential to free feminist law reform ef-
forts from the confines of the ideal of the private/state-governed family.”). 
 147. See Collins, supra note 43, at 1768 (arguing that the state sovereignty 
paradigm is a “theory of convenience, strategically invoked and easily dis-
missed or ignored”). 
 148. See id. at 1782–1843. 
 149. See id. at 1782–1803. 
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shows that no congressman objected to these federal programs 
on the grounds that domestic relations were exclusively a mat-
ter of state responsibility.150 Federal courts also resolved do-
mestic issues such as the regulation of married women’s citi-
zenship.151 Federal regulation of domestic relations in the pre-
Civil War era effectively restructured hierarchical male-female 
relationships by giving women greater access to economic and 
legal resources.152 
The use of the state sovereignty paradigm to limit federal 
power arose out of the desire to maintain slavery in the 
South.153 The possibility of federal involvement in domestic re-
lations constituted an “ominous threat for slave owners.”154 If 
the federal government could regulate domestic relations of any 
sort, then by implication it could control master-slave rela-
tions.155 To oppose federal intervention in slavery, southern 
congressmen contested the ability of the federal government to 
regulate marriage.156 Hostility towards federal involvement in 
the family is evidenced by the debate over the Morrill Act, the 
first federal statute to criminalize polygamy.157 Southern con-
gressmen opposed the Act on the understanding that allowing 
the federal government to exercise power over a couple’s mari-
tal affairs would ultimately lead to federal intervention in the 
master-slave relationship.158 
While opposition to federal involvement in domestic rela-
tions increased, Congress nevertheless intervened to mitigate 
violence experienced at the local level. During Reconstruction, 
Congress enacted legislation that applied nationwide against 
the Ku Klux Klan and other terrorist organizations.159 This leg-
 
 150. See id. at 1785, 1802. 
 151. See id. at 1815 (noting that in Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 
(1830), a federal court overruled a state supreme court’s determination of a 
married woman’s citizenship). 
 152. See id. at 1767–68. 
 153. See id. at 1844–45. 
 154. See id. at 1844. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at 1844–45; cf. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and 
Congress’s Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral 
Anomaly, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 153, 157 (2004) (“[G]iven the history of Con-
gress’s judicially recognized plenary power to enforce the constitutionally se-
cured property rights of slaveholders, Congress had to possess comparable 
power to enforce the human rights and equality of all Americans.”). 
 157. Morrill Act, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501  (1862) (repealed 1910). 
 158. See Collins, supra note 43, at 1845. 
 159. See MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 152. 
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islation aimed to stop white supremacist groups from subject-
ing African Americans to physical and sexual violence.160 As 
this federal legislation demonstrates, the state sovereignty 
paradigm did not stop previous Congresses from acting to pre-
vent local violence. 
The preservation of the gendered public and private 
spheres evolved to become the explicit goal of advocates of the 
state sovereignty paradigm during the early twentieth cen-
tury.161 At this time, opponents of women’s suffrage asserted 
that a federal amendment allowing women to vote would cor-
rupt the family.162 Opponents argued that enfranchising 
women would introduce “‘the bedlam of political debate’ into 
the home,”163 distract women from their household duties,164 
and “threaten[] the unity of the marriage relation.”165 Para-
doxically, at the same time that legislators opposed federal in-
tervention in the family, they also demanded federal solutions 
to nationwide marital “problems.”166 Alarmed by the frequency 
of divorce and a perceived increase in interracial marriage, leg-
islators argued that the federal government should regulate 
domestic relations.167 At the core of each of these contentious 
issues—women’s suffrage, divorce, and interracial marriage—
was women’s “traditional” role in the family.168 Advocates in-
voked either the primacy of state sovereignty or the necessity of 
federal power to preserve the family’s gender hierarchy.169 
The historically contingent arguments for and against fed-
eral regulation of domestic relations teach an important lesson 
about the operation of the state sovereignty paradigm. Tradi-
tionally, the state sovereignty paradigm has acted as a rhetori-
 
 160. See id. at 155 (“[Ku Klux] Klan violence during Reconstruction, like 
much gender-based violence today, was often highly sexualized, including 
eroticized whipping, oral rape, genital mutilation, and other forms of sexual 
torture.”). 
 161. See Adler, supra note 45, at 199 (“[I]nvestment in state rather than 
federal control over family is incidental to our legal culture’s larger investment 
in preserving family’s place in the private sphere.”). 
 162. See Collins, supra note 43, at 1851–53. 
 163. Id. at 1852 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 48-1330, at 3 (1884)). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (quoting Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amend-
ment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 993 
(2002)). 
 166. See id. at 1851. 
 167. Id. at 1853–56. 
 168. See id. 
 169. Id. at 1856. 
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cal device to advance specific social agendas concerning women. 
The use of the paradigm continues today to women’s detriment, 
as illustrated by a comparison of United States v. Morrison170 
and Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.171 In 
Morrison, the Supreme Court prevented victims of domestic 
violence from suing their abusers in federal court.172 Hibbs, on 
the other hand, declared that the states are not immune from 
legal liability when they deny state employees unpaid leave to 
care for family members with a “serious health condition.”173 
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, “the States’ record of un-
constitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based 
discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is 
weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [fed-
eral] legislation.”174 In contrast to Morrison, the Supreme Court 
in Hibbs allowed federal intervention in domestic relations by 
validating the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 
While the different outcomes in Morrison and Hibbs may 
be reconciled, they nevertheless reveal how the state sover-
eignty paradigm continues to subordinate women.175 The 
Court’s decision in Hibbs rested on the idea that Congress 
could permissibly regulate the “public” arena of the workplace, 
whereas in Morrison, privacy concerns preempted federal in-
tervention in the home.176 However, distinguishing these cases 
in this regard relies on a shallow analysis of Hibbs. Ultimately, 
the Hibbs decision expressly permitted the federal government 
to “fix” the gender hierarchy of the household.177 Through fed-
eral legislation that allowed both men and women to take time 
off work for care-taking responsibilities, Hibbs attempted to 
correct state policies that assumed women alone were responsi-
ble for care-giving.178 Morrison could have also ameliorated 
gender hierarchy in the home by providing federal redress for 
 
 170. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 171. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 172. 529 U.S. at 627. 
 173. 538 U.S. at 724–25. 
 174. Id. at 735. 
 175. Collins, supra note 43, at 1768. 
 176. See id. at 1774 (“[The] FMLA is more easily seen as a labor regulation 
and, as such, is more readily understood as addressing a ‘federal’ issue.”). 
 177. See id. at 1773 (“[W]hen [the] FMLA was challenged on federalism 
grounds before the Supreme Court, much attention was given to the fact that 
[the] FMLA was intended to foster gender equality in the allocation of care-
giving responsibilities within families.”). 
 178. Id. 
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the violence that impedes gender equality. While privacy con-
cerns were prevalent in Morrison, the Court did not display 
similar concerns in Hibbs,179 despite the fact that the federal 
regulation in Hibbs did not impact the workplace so much as it 
attempted to achieve gender equality within the home.180 
The inconsistent application of the state sovereignty para-
digm in Morrison and Hibbs lends credibility to the suggestion 
that federal judges “tend to ‘selectively invoke[]’ federalism 
rules ‘only when ideologically convenient.’”181 While the gender 
discrimination at issue in Hibbs was cognizable as a federal 
matter, the gender discrimination targeted by VAWA was 
not.182 Arguably, this “pick and choose” approach is “motivated 
largely (or entirely) by a hostility to women’s rights.”183 Un-
doubtedly, women have gained a larger presence in the work-
place since the 1960s.184 Perhaps the growing acceptance of 
women’s right to work has made federal laws that make it eas-
ier for women to work more permissible. In contrast, women’s 
right to be free from violence remains socially tenuous, as dem-
onstrated by the fact that many states, as well as the federal 
government, have only recently acted to try to stop violence 
against women.185 While courts and legislators accept that the 
federal government may actively seek new roles for women in 
the workplace, the propriety of federal action designed to un-
dermine what some deem a fundamental source of women’s 
inequality—physical and sexual violence by men—remains con-
troversial.186 
 
 179. See id. at 1762–63. 
 180. See id. at 1773. 
 181. See id. at 1771 (alteration in original) (quoting Frank B. Cross, Real-
ism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1306 (1999)). 
 182. See id. at 1774. 
 183. Saylor, supra note 119, at 141. 
 184. Eduardo Porter, Stretched to Limit, Women Stall March to Work, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at C2.  
 185. See Rousseve, supra note 92, at 440 (“[I]t was not until the 1970s and 
1980s that the criminal justice system abandoned its policy of non-
intervention and began to treat domestic violence as a public crime.”); Herbert, 
supra note 22 (“[W]e have become so accustomed to living in a society satu-
rated with misogyny that violence against females is more or less to be ex-
pected.”). 
 186. Feminist scholars argue that the Morrison decision demonstrates the 
legal system’s reluctance to punish domestic violence. See MacKinnon, supra 
note 50, at 171 (“[Morrison’s decision that] systematic state nonintervention in 
the private is not a state act, is a public decision by the highest Court of the 
nation to support male power, i.e. sex inequality, in the most violent sphere in 
which it is socially exercised.”). 
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C. ADMINISTERING THE FEDERAL GUN BANS IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY PARADIGM DOES NOT DETER 
GUN VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
Federal gun bans reinforce the state sovereignty paradigm 
by operating as “federal supplemental sanctions.”187 To be im-
plemented, the laws rely on state courts to determine whether 
a person is “subject to an order for protection” or has been “con-
victed of a domestic violence misdemeanor” under state law.188 
However, the ways in which the bans are actually implemented 
remain unclear. Federal laws do not specify who must notify 
the victim and defendant of the gun bans, determine whether 
the defendant is armed, remove and store the gun, or inform 
the victim in cases when the defendant is rearmed.189 The ab-
sence of these vital terms ensures that the federal laws must 
rely on the states’ method of disarming batterers.190 The lack of 
a meaningful federal process to disarm batterers presupposes 
that the states should regulate domestic relations. What the 
laws overlook is that many states have no mechanisms to re-
move guns and others do so erratically. 
By implicitly accepting the flawed state sovereignty para-
digm, the federal gun bans fail to deter violence against 
women. Three major problems result from this administration 
of federal law. First, states have few incentives to enforce the 
federal gun bans and the federal government does not do so it-
self. Second, the lack of transparency in regard to which the 
government entity is responsible for carrying out the federal 
gun bans means that neither the state nor federal governments 
are accountable for achieving the laws’ mandate. This lack of 
clarity creates indeterminacy and unpredictability in the law 
 
 187. See Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1411, 1416 (2005) (defining federal supplemental sanctions 
as “the consequences that follow by operation of federal law” after “a state offi-
cial determines that a state law is violated”). 
 188. See id. at 1416–18. 
 189. See Golden, supra note 123, at 456 (“The lack of clarity as to whether 
federal or state law prevails in the Lautenberg Amendment context could 
cause courts to apply the Lautenberg Amendment differently and arbitrar-
ily.”); Mikos, supra note 187, at 1419 (“The federal government makes no ef-
fort to even inform the convict of the sanction, and compliance with the sanc-
tion is entirely the responsibility of the party subject to it.”); id. at 1414 (“In 
essence, Congress free rides on the efforts of state law enforcement agencies.”). 
 190. See BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 2 (“[T]he federal laws cannot 
be fully enforced, and will not be completely effective in disarming abusers, 
without complementary and implementing legislation from the states.”). 
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and consequently results in a third problem. State judges, not 
federal or state legislators, ultimately make the decisions that 
give substantive meaning to the federal firearm bans. 
1. States Have Few Incentives to Implement the Federal Gun 
Bans 
There is no provision in the federal gun bans that provides 
economic incentives to states to enforce the federal laws.191 
Without monetary support, many states may not carry out the 
laws. States that currently have no laws to disarm batterers 
are unlikely to use state resources to enforce a federal law that 
is not even a priority for—and may in fact be opposed by— 
their constituents. States that already disarm batterers in 
some capacity will not be compelled to divert their resources to 
enforce the federal bans, as these states will likely prefer to de-
vote time and money to enforcing their own gun bans. However, 
many of the states’ gun bans use poor or ineffective mecha-
nisms to remove the guns. Although the federal gun bans may 
help some women pursue federal prosecution of their armed 
batterers when a state remedy is not available, providing a 
remedy after-the-fact is not the same as preventing batterers 
from becoming armed, the laws’ original purpose.192 When the 
federal government neither devotes its own police power to en-
forcing the gun laws nor effectively persuades the states to do 
so, the gun laws cannot achieve their goal. 
The federal government’s failure to establish an effective 
means of disarming batterers has several negative effects. 
Since federal legislators purportedly represent national norms 
and moral standards, their inability to develop a realistic 
method of disarming batterers signals that they do not consider 
gun violence against women a national problem worthy of a na-
tional solution.193 Consequently, violence against women is not 
legitimized as a serious crime worthy of punishment.194 
 
 191. See Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (West 2000 & Supp. 
2006). 
 192. See May, supra note 24, at 6 (“[The federal gun bans] are preventative 
measures; they target deadly abuse before it happens. By requiring abusers to 
relinquish their firearms as soon as courts find them to be abusive, the laws 
protect domestic abuse victims from gun violence before guns have been impli-
cated in the abuse pattern.”). 
 193. See Adler, supra note 45, at 203 (“[F]ederal reluctance to address fam-
ily litigation betrays a gendered stratification of legal issues in which federal 
 . . . attention is reserved for matters of national significance.”). 
 194. See Developments in the Law—Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 
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Additionally, Congress undermines the unique, national 
representative capacity of federal law.195 Since the federal laws 
do not delineate how batterers must be disarmed, both identify-
ing batterers and removing their guns ultimately depends on 
state policies that are never formally approved by Congress.196 
The results is a political process problem. Rather than reflect-
ing collective national interests, the federal gun bans acquiesce 
to local priorities on guns and domestic violence.197 These lo-
calities—defined by their own values and worldviews—are not 
accountable to the interests of the nation as a whole. In the 
worst case scenario, the misogynist views of one jurisdiction 
may assume federal status by standing in for federal law.198 
Lastly, by relying on state policies, Congress deprives 
women of a fundamental component of the constitutional de-
sign. Namely, it disables women from accessing an important 
“laboratory”—the federal government itself.199 Ultimately, Con-
gress denies women the opportunity to benefit from a solution 
that only the federal government can provide: a national, care-
fully crafted approach that adopts effective state laws while 
discarding those that have proven to be ineffective. 
2. The Federal Gun Bans Abate State Responsibility for 
Domestic Violence 
While reliance on the state sovereignty paradigm incapaci-
tates the federal gun bans, the federal laws themselves also 
impair the states from deterring gun violence and domestic 
abuse. This dilution of government power occurs because the 
federal gun bans weaken the ability of the states to prosecute 
 
106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1543 (1993) [hereinafter Legal Responses] (“[Non-
enforcement of the federal firearm bans] communicate[s] a message that do-
mestic violence is not as serious as assault between strangers . . . .”). 
 195. See Logan, supra note 80, at 87. 
 196. See id. (arguing that the political economies of the states are unavoid-
ably incorporated into state law). 
 197. See id. at 67 (“[The United States] actually uses state laws and out-
comes, and in doing so infuses federal law with the normative judgments of 
the respective states.”). 
 198. See id. at 89 (“[B]y deferring to state laws and outcomes the [United 
States] allocates to states the power to define the content and application of 
federal law.”); Mikos, supra note 187, at 1431 (“State laws differ, and those 
differences will carry over to congressional statutes that refer to them.”). 
 199. See Logan, supra note 80, at 84 (“As a result of federal deference, 
there is one less ‘lab’ (the U.S. government) that can be used to address per-
ceived anti-social behavior.”). 
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domestic violence crimes.200 Since a defendant faces the possi-
bility of federal sanctions (and possibly state sanctions as well), 
suspected abusers have a compelling reason to refuse a guilty 
plea to a crime of domestic violence and to contest the issuance 
of an order for protection.201 
State prosecutors thus face a dilemma—whether to take 
the case to trial or to offer the defendant a plea bargain.202 Tri-
als are costly both in terms of money and time. In addition, 
domestic violence cases are often “he said, she said” situations 
and many victims recant or refuse to cooperate, making the 
cases difficult to prove.203 Furthermore, the stiff penalties that 
the court may be impose on the defendant strengthens the like-
lihood that he will vigorously defend himself.204 Due to these 
inherent limitations, many prosecutors will hesitate to expend 
their scarce resources on a trial.205 
Alternatively, prosecutors may opt to modify the criminal 
charges through plea deals.206 For instance, to settle the case 
and avoid trial, a prosecutor might change the misdemeanor 
domestic violence charge to a misdemeanor conviction for “dis-
orderly conduct.”207 This action guarantees the prosecutor a 
conviction while avoiding the expense of a trial. However, such 
a scenario allows prosecutors and defendants to avoid the gun 
bans entirely. Removing the domestic violence misdemeanor 
conviction—and the corresponding ban on firearms—from the 
 
 200. See Mikos, supra note 187, at 1415 (“[A] state may try to skirt the fed-
eral sanctions . . . to minimize the costs of enforcing its own laws or to thwart 
federal policies with which the state or its agents disagree.”). 
 201. See id. at 1457 (demonstrating that while the significance of the fire-
arms ban depends on the value the abuser attaches to the privilege of possess-
ing a firearm, it is “particularly severe” for anyone who must handle a firearm 
on the job since they will lose their job once the ban is triggered). 
 202. See id. at 1420. 
 203. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 22 (noting that many women 
never speak of domestic abuse). 
 204. See Mikos, supra note 187, at 1459–60 (“Many convicted domestic 
abusers have sought to withdraw their guilty pleas, claiming they would have 
opted for trial had they known about the firearms ban. . . . Further, defense 
attorneys have noted a rise in trial rates for domestic violence cases since the 
Lautenberg Amendment was enacted.”). 
 205. See id. at 1462 (noting that since prosecutors may not consider domes-
tic violence cases to be a high priority, they are unlikely to divert resources 
from other cases to bring domestic violence cases to trial). 
 206. See id. at 1420. 
 207. See id. at 1460 (arguing that a defendant will be more likely to plead 
to disorderly conduct than to assault and battery so as to avoid the firearms 
ban). 
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table allows the prosecutor to get an easier conviction while the 
defendant gets to keep his guns.208 
In addition to undermining federal law, plea bargaining 
also obstructs state law. Instead of using state statutes to pun-
ish domestic violence, the prosecutor may forego domestic vio-
lence convictions in favor of lesser charges.209 Consequently, 
the prosecutor does not rely upon either the federal or state 
gun bans. As a result, plea bargaining circumvents both state 
and federal laws designed to help battered women. 
Federal and state actors are further discouraged from car-
rying out the firearm bans because neither entity is held ac-
countable for protecting women against gun violence. The fire-
arm bans set up a blame game scenario wherein legislators, 
police officers, and state and federal attorneys avoid political 
consequences. On the one hand, state actors can easily attrib-
ute the failure of the firearm bans to federal authorities. After 
all, it is the U.S. Attorneys’ offices that must prosecute and 
sentence individuals who violate the federal gun bans.210 The 
states’ integral role in identifying which persons are prohibited 
from owning guns and removing their guns is hidden from the 
average constituent, who may be unfamiliar with how the fed-
eral gun bans are implemented. 
On the other hand, federal legislators can also blame the 
failure of the firearms bans on state governments. By simply 
reiterating the state sovereignty paradigm, members of Con-
gress can argue that federal action is necessarily limited, since 
the “private sphere” is ultimately within the domain of the 
State.211 According to this perspective, if state legislators and 
judges choose not to step into conflicts between intimate part-
ners or to send police officers to disarm abusers in their homes, 
there is little that Congress can do. 
When neither the state nor federal governments take re-
sponsibility for effectively implementing the firearm bans, 
women must resort to their own devices to protect themselves 
 
 208. See id. at 1461 (“State prosecutors have acknowledged that they re-
duce state charges to help some defendants avoid Lautenberg consequences.”). 
 209. See id. (“Avoiding a conviction not only undermines the congressional 
aims behind the firearms ban, it may dilute the state sanctions as well. . . . 
[D]efendants . . . may not be punished at all for their actions—by either the 
[S]tate or Congress.”). 
 210. See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 140, at 51–52. 
 211. See MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 171–72 (arguing that the federal 
government designates domestic violence as a “private” problem that does not 
require federal intervention). 
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and their families.212 Unfortunately, as in the case of Teri Lee, 
even when women take steps to safeguard their own lives, their 
abusers often prevail.213 In dire situations, an abused woman 
may have no alternative but to use a gun against her partner to 
end his destructive control.214 The failure of state and federal 
authorities to disarm batterers is therefore likely to result in 
the continued abuse—and murder—of women. 
3. The Federal Gun Bans Allow Excessive Judicial Discretion 
The administration of the federal gun bans problematically 
allows for judicial discretion. When there is no state law to 
guide how the federal firearm bans are to be effectuated, state 
judges inevitably must fill in the gaps. Since the states already 
approach domestic violence in vastly distinct ways,215 judges 
will likely interpret the federal gun bans very differently. The 
absence of a concrete standard results in unfairness both to vic-
tims and to defendants.216 Some defendants are disarmed while 
other similarly situated defendants are not. Likewise, some vic-
tims are protected while other similarly situated victims are 
not. These unpredictable outcomes undercut the ability of the 
states and the federal government to administer gun removal 
programs that the public will view as a legitimate, just exercise 
of government power.217 
In cases of domestic violence, it is questionable whether ju-
dicial discretion achieves fairness. Historically, judges have 
doubted the credibility of domestic abuse victims.218 Judges, 
 
 212. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 6–10, 17–21. 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 1–21. 
 214. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL 
AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 30 (1989) (“When a battered woman kills her 
abuser, she has reached the end of the line. She is absolutely desperate, in real 
despair. She believes, with good reason, that if she does not kill, she will be 
killed.”). 
 215. See Mikos, supra note 187, at 1430 (“Under our federal system, states 
have wide latitude to define crimes and their consequences to suit local tastes . 
. . . It should thus come as no surprise that the criminal law differs substan-
tively from state to state.”). 
 216. See id. at 1428 (“Justice demands treating like cases alike. . . . The 
fairness of federal sanctions is called into doubt when they are triggered by 
some, but not all, similar cases.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 217. See id. at 1430–31. 
 218. See May, supra note 24, at 25–26 (“[L]ittle has changed over the years 
in judicial attitudes toward victims of domestic violence. . . . Some judges dis-
count the credibility of women because they view women as unreasonable and 
overly emotional.”). 
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like the public, often believe the victim deserved the abuse or 
was irresponsible because she “should have left.”219 Unfortu-
nately, the risk that such stereotypes will improperly influence 
a judge’s decision remains real.220 
Judicial discretion in the context of domestic violence poses 
further challenges since it easily eludes review.221 Misde-
meanor domestic violence cases and order for protection hear-
ings tend to be low-profile matters with little money at stake.222 
At order for protection hearings, victims are usually not repre-
sented by counsel.223 Victims rarely appeal adverse decisions 
and the records created at trial are often unrevealing and diffi-
cult to access.224 Without the safeguarding effects of adversarial 
representation and appellate review, judges may apply the laws 
subjectively. 
By relying on the state sovereignty paradigm, the federal 
gun bans place women and their families in a dangerous situa-
tion. Nationally, the federal government purports to be taking 
unprecedented steps to stop gun violence against women.225 Lo-
cally, however, Congress abdicates its authority to the states, 
allowing home-grown values regarding women’s roles, male vio-
lence, and gun ownership to determine the effectiveness of fed-
eral law. In the majority of states without laws mandating fire-
arm removal, women are at risk. In the states where an abused 
woman’s case satisfies the statutory requirements to remove 
the gun—and state authorities actually confiscate and retain 
the gun—some women may benefit. Congress will then applaud 
women’s successes as evidence of the statutes’ effectiveness, 
 
 219. See id. at 28 (“Common misperceptions, like the belief that victims 
could leave the relationships if they wanted to and the resulting frustration 
with them for not leaving, lead to inherent biases against victims.”); Anne C. 
Johnson, Note, From House to Home: Creating a Right to Early Lease Termi-
nation for Domestic Violence Victims, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1859, 1862 (2006) 
(“Some people . . . including . . . judges . . . believe that victims ‘provoke’ their 
abusers, thereby holding victims responsible for their abuse.”). 
 220. See May, supra note 24, at 25 (arguing that local judges continue to 
disregard domestic violence laws due to “ingrained biases against battered 
women”). 
 221. See id. at 10. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Domestic Violence Prevention, 
39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1341, 1342 (Oct. 8, 2003) (“The fight against 
domestic violence is a national movement. . . . Our government is engaged in 
the fight . . . .”). 
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while disregarding women’s losses as a matter of state concern. 
However, what Congress ignores is that a single adverse ruling 
for a battered woman like Teri Lee could prove fatal.226 
III.  RETHINKING THE FEDERAL GUN BANS   
Ultimately, battered women do not have the luxury of con-
cerning themselves with the proper exercise of federal and 
state power.227 What women want is quick and effective protec-
tion for themselves and their families.228 To realize this goal, 
Congress should take three immediate steps. First, Congress 
should provide funding for states to adopt the federal gun bans 
to serve as a minimum requirement for disarming batterers. 
Second, Congress should facilitate the states’ ability to remove 
guns by providing monetary incentives for the creation of local 
gun units. Lastly, Congress should require states to report in-
formation regarding individuals prohibited from possessing 
firearms to federal authorities so that Congress may strategi-
cally disseminate grants to the areas of the country most in 
need. 
A. USING CONGRESS’S SPENDING POWER TO ENCOURAGE STATE 
ACTION 
Supreme Court precedent limits Congress’s ability to in-
duce state legislatures or executives to enforce federal law. In 
New York v. United States, the Supreme Court established an 
“anti-commandeering” principle, stating that Congress cannot 
compel state legislatures to adopt federal law as state law.229 In 
addition, the Court held in Printz v. United States that Con-
gress cannot coerce a state’s executive branch to enforce federal 
law.230 At issue in Printz was the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act of 1993.231 This federal law directed state law 
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on individu-
als and to provide the information to firearm dealers.232 The 
Court found that the Act unconstitutionally superseded state 
sovereignty by converting state police forces into an arm of the 
 
 226. See supra text accompanying notes 1–21. 
 227. See MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 176. 
 228. See id. 
 229. 505 U.S. 144, 146 (1992). 
 230. 521 U.S. 898, 900 (1997). 
 231. Id. at 902. 
 232. Id. at 904. 
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federal government.233 Under New York and Printz, Congress 
can neither command state legislatures to adopt the federal 
gun bans as state statutes, nor amend the federal gun bans to 
require state authorities to execute the laws. 
However, Congress still retains several important means of 
influencing the states. Foremost among these is Congress’s 
ability to encourage state action through exercise of its spend-
ing power.234 In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court held that Con-
gress may attach conditions to federal funds.235 In Dole, the 
Court found constitutional a federal law that withheld federal 
highway funds from any state that allowed persons under the 
age of twenty-one to purchase or possess alcohol.236 At the time, 
a South Dakota law permitted nineteen-year-olds to buy 
beer.237 Under Dole, South Dakota was forced to set its age 
limit at twenty-one years, as required by federal law, or forego 
federal funds.238 The Court thus acknowledged that Congress 
can constitutionally achieve objectives not outlined in its enu-
merated powers through the conditional grant of federal 
funds.239 
1. Congress Should Provide Funds to States to Induce 
Adoption of the Federal Gun Bans 
In accordance with Dole, Congress should use its spending 
power to entice state legislatures to adopt the federal gun bans 
as state law.240 An amendment to VAWA would make federal 
funds available to the states for several purposes. Money could 
be appropriated to train local judges to disarm batterers, to 
provide additional resources for state prosecutors and victim 
advocates, and to promote cooperation between state and fed-
eral authorities during the process of identifying, disarming, 
and prosecuting batterers who possess guns. As a condition for 
receipt of these funds, Congress should stipulate that state leg-
 
 233. Id. at 935. 
 234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 235. 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
 236. Id. at 212. 
 237. Id. at 205. 
 238. Id. at 210. 
 239. Id. at 207. 
 240. See Sack, supra note 35, at 10 (“Although domestic violence offenders 
are already subject to the federal law, state legislation makes it straightfor-
ward that the state courts must implement the law and thereby prevents re-
sistant judges from failing to enforce firearms laws in domestic violence 
cases.”). 
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islatures must adopt the federal gun bans as a minimum re-
quirement for disarming batterers. Since Congress already uses 
VAWA to distribute money to the states to create resources for 
battered women, VAWA would also be an effective vehicle for 
imposing this condition and disseminating the proposed 
grants.241 
The federal law adopted by the states should first be 
amended to clearly outline the disarmament process. The law 
should require that, upon issuing an order for protection or a 
domestic violence misdemeanor conviction, the judge must ask 
both parties whether the defendant currently owns or possesses 
a gun.242 The judge should then explain that the defendant can 
no longer possess or purchase a gun under state law.243 The 
judge should issue a standardized form outlining the gun pro-
hibition and specifying the types of guns in the defendant’s pos-
session.244 The gun prohibition should be unambiguously in-
cluded in both civil and criminal no-contact orders.245 
Most importantly, the order should state that the respon-
dent must turn in his guns to a local gun repository, as speci-
fied by the court, within forty-eight hours.246 Alternatively, if 
 
 241. Cf. id. at 22 (arguing that the current lack of guidelines regarding the 
enforcement of the federal firearm bans resembles the confusion that resulted 
upon VAWA’s requirement that each jurisdiction give full faith and credit to 
domestic violence protection orders, and noting that Congress allocated funds 
to train state law enforcement officials to standardize implementation of the 
full faith and credit provision). 
 242. See Cole, supra note 132, at 557 (stating that judges need to ask 
whether the defendant owns guns); cf. Sack, supra note 35, at 18–19 (noting 
that the protocol in Miami-Dade County, Florida requires a judge to make an 
“on-record” inquiry of each respondent to verify the current status of weap-
ons). 
 243. See Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 308 (showing that North 
Carolina and California already have similar policies). 
 244. See Sack, supra note 35, at 18 (stating that for full faith and credit 
purposes, clearly outlining the gun prohibition will alert law enforcement offi-
cers in other states that the order implicates the firearm bans); cf. BRADY 
CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 6 (demonstrating that six states and the District 
of Columbia have already taken steps toward issuing uniform orders for pro-
tection through their participation in a program called Project Passport, which 
requires that all restraining orders have a similar first page). 
 245. Generally, the Act has been interpreted to apply to orders for protec-
tion issued in civil courts. To target batterers more accurately, the firearm 
bans must also apply to no-contact orders issued in criminal courts. See BRADY 
CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 5. By applying the statute to both civil and 
criminal no-contact orders, the Act would cast a wider net. 
 246. Cf. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(c) (West 2004) (requiring that a respondent 
relinquish any firearms possessed within twenty-four hours, either by turning 
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the defendant is on probation, the court might order him to give 
up his guns to his probation officer, who would then be respon-
sible for depositing the guns.247 The order should state that if 
the respondent fails to turn in his weapons within the specified 
time period, a warrant will be issued for his arrest.248 The war-
rant shall authorize police officers to search his residence and 
seize the guns.249 During the time when the defendant remains 
armed, the judge should take proactive steps to ensure the vic-
tim’s safety. For instance, the judge could ensure that the vic-
tim meets with a court-appointed “victim advocate” who could 
develop a safety plan with her, refer her to domestic abuse shel-
ters, or help her change the locks at her residence. 
The effect of the grant program would be particularly pro-
found in the twenty-six states that currently have no laws to 
disarm batterers. Access to federal funds would entice such 
states to adopt the laws since states would not be independ-
ently responsible for paying for the program. Some states might 
remain politically opposed to taking guns away from individu-
als. Still, the grant program would likely help proponents of 
disarmament win greater support by creating a viable system 
for gun confiscation that state legislatures and lobbying groups 
could consider. 
States that already have laws allowing judges and police to 
disarm batterers could also benefit from the federal grants. 
 
them in to local law enforcement or by selling them to a licensed dealer); N.Y. 
FAM. CT. ACT § 842-a5(a) (McKinney Supp. 2006) (“[T]he . . . order of protec-
tion shall specify the place where such firearms shall be surrendered, shall 
specify a date and time by which the surrender shall be completed and, to the 
extent possible, shall describe such firearms to be surrendered and shall direct 
the authority receiving such surrendered firearms to immediately notify the 
court of such surrender.”). 
 247. See Sack, supra note 35, at 20 (noting that probation officers in Seat-
tle are directly involved with confiscating weapons from respondents and that 
probation units routinely screen defendants to check for existing protection 
orders and to ask about firearms). 
 248. Cf. HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7(f ) (1998) (permitting a police officer to ap-
ply for a search warrant for the limited purpose of seizing a firearm or ammu-
nition); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5 (Supp. 2006) (authorizing the court to 
issue a search warrant for a peace officer to seize any and all firearms). 
 249. Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28j (West 2005) (authorizing an ex parte 
order to “forbid[ ] the defendant from possessing any firearm or other weapon 
. . . [or] order[ ] the search for and seizure of any such weapon at any location 
where the judge has reasonable cause to believe the weapon is located”); id. 
§ 2C:25-29b(16) (ordering the search for and seizure of any prohibited firearm 
at any location where the judge has reasonable cause to believe the weapon is 
located). 
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Since a state’s adoption of the federal laws is the minimum re-
quired to receive the federal grants, doing so would not displace 
state laws that disarm batterers more aggressively. The federal 
legislation adopted by the states should provide that the federal 
gun bans supersede any prior state legislation or policy that 
conflicts with their operation. However, adoption of the federal 
laws would not curtail the states’ ability to enact more progres-
sive solutions to domestic violence. By using grants to encour-
age all states to ensure women a minimum level of protection 
from gun violence, Congress would take steps toward establish-
ing a uniform approach to disarming batterers nationwide. 
States that agreed to adopt Congress’s minimum standards 
would benefit from the extra funds they would receive to en-
force the laws. 
States that accept the federal grant and its conditions will 
better deter batterers from possessing guns.250 Batterers will 
face a greater likelihood of being penalized if they fail to follow 
the law, since they can be prosecuted under either state or fed-
eral law, or both.251 In addition, batterers would be more 
quickly and effectively disarmed. The same state judge who 
presides over the defendant’s domestic violence misdemeanor 
case or issues the order for protection must require the defen-
dant to give up his guns. State judges are therefore required to 
take immediate steps to remove the guns while the defendants 
are in their courtrooms. 
2. Congress Should Provide Funds to Establish Local Gun 
Units 
Congress should also provide funds through VAWA for the 
formation of locally operated gun units that would serve to dis-
arm batterers.252 Any state that receives this grant would be 
 
 250. See BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 7 (noting that after Illinois 
enacted a law prohibiting violent misdemeanants from purchasing a firearm 
in 1996, more than 28,000 Illinois domestic violence misdemeanants were 
added to databases that prohibited them from purchasing firearms). 
 251. See Logan, supra note 80, at 68 (“Double prosecution [by the federal 
and state governments] is permissible . . . because the respective governments 
are ‘two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of deal-
ing with the same subject-matter within the same territory.’” (quoting United 
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922))); Sack, supra note 35, at 10 (noting 
that the differing state and federal laws do not pose a Supremacy Clause issue 
since the laws are “‘parallel restrictions,’ both of which remain applicable”). 
 252. Richmond, Virginia’s Project Exile may be a model for the develop-
ment of locally operated gun units. See Sack, supra note 35, at 20–21 (explain-
ing that police officers in Richmond who participate in this program receive 
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required to establish gun units at an appropriate jurisdictional 
level.253 The grant would further require that each gun unit be 
staffed by law enforcement officials, investigators, prosecutors, 
and administrative personnel. Teams within the units would be 
responsible for the operation of a gun repository as well as for 
investigation and enforcement of the gun bans. 
Using federal funds to create locally operated gun reposito-
ries would establish secure sites where individuals could relin-
quish their guns.254 Upon receipt of a firearm, state employees 
would catalogue the deposit and safely store the gun. The re-
pository would issue a formal receipt to the defendant confirm-
ing that he had turned in his gun. A copy of the receipt would 
be sent to the judge who issued the court order as well as to the 
victim.255 If the prohibited individual becomes eligible to re-
trieve his firearm—either because the order for protection ex-
pires or because his record is expunged—the gun repository 
employees would make reasonable efforts to notify the victim 
that the individual is once again armed.256 
In addition to operating the repository, the gun units 
would be equipped to handle situations where a batterer either 
refuses to turn over his guns or purchases new firearms. The 
unit’s law enforcement officers would be automatically updated 
if the prohibited individual does not comply with the court’s or-
der to turn in his gun. The officers would then undertake all 
necessary steps to find the individual and his firearms in order 
to arrest and disarm him. Furthermore, investigators would 
routinely compare databases that confirm information about 
prohibited individuals with those identifying gun purchases 
and licenses. Investigators could flag batterers who purchase 
guns after the court has issued an order for protection or mis-
demeanor conviction. The gun unit’s police officers would then 
 
special training to enforce state and federal firearm bans). 
 253. States should create the gun units at the most appropriate level of 
their jurisdiction. For instance, the gun units could be created at the state, 
county, or city level. 
 254. Cf. WIS. STAT. § 813.12(4m) (2006) (permitting storage of a firearm in 
a public warehouse). 
 255. Cf. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(c) (West 2004) (ordering respondents to file 
a receipt with the court that proves that any firearms were either relinquished 
to the police or sold within seventy-two hours of the issuance of the court or-
der). 
 256. See generally Sack, supra note 35, at 19 (summarizing the court pro-
cedure defendants in one jurisdiction must undertake to obtain their confis-
cated guns). 
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obtain a warrant to apprehend and disarm the person. 
Beyond these services, state personnel would monitor com-
pliance with the gun bans. State employees would review 
whether police officers promptly and effectively disarm batter-
ers. The gun unit would also administer volunteer-based “citi-
zen watchdog groups.”257 Trained participants would attend 
court hearings to observe whether judges abide by the gun bans 
when arraigning domestic violence misdemeanants and issuing 
orders for protection. Volunteers would compile their observa-
tions in a published report. Sharing such information would in-
crease the accountability of judges who fail to effectuate the 
gun bans, because battered women’s advocacy groups and me-
dia outlets could subject such them to public recrimination. The 
reports could be submitted to the chief judicial officer to inquire 
into the judges’ practices, thus stimulating greater judicial 
oversight. 
Recent federal laws serve as models for how Congress 
could craft legislation to provide incentives for the states to 
create gun units. Both the Hate Crimes Prevention Program258 
and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Pro-
gram259 distribute federal funds to states and organizations for 
the purpose of combating specific crimes.260 Congress could 
draw on the statutory language of both programs to amend 
VAWA to include grants for combating gun violence against 
women. For instance, the Hate Crimes Prevention statute au-
thorizes the Department of Justice (DOJ) to make grants to lo-
cal organizations “for the purpose of providing assistance to lo-
calities most directly affected by hate crimes.”261 Similarly, an 
amendment to VAWA should authorize the DOJ to distribute 
money to states to instruct police officers, prosecutors, and 
judges how to investigate, disarm, and prosecute batterers who 
possess guns. 
 
 257. Such volunteer-based groups could be modeled after WATCH, a com-
munity organization in Minneapolis that trains volunteers to monitor and re-
port on the criminal justice system to ensure the fair treatment of domestic 
violence victims. See WATCH, http://www.watchmn.org (last visited Feb. 12, 
2007). 
 258. 20 U.S.C. § 7133(a) (Supp. IV 2001–2006). 
 259. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3796dd to 3796dd-8 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
 260. See 20 U.S.C. § 7133(a) (providing federal funds to local organizations 
to combat hate crimes); 42 U.S.C.A. § 3796dd(a) (authorizing grants to states 
and other entities to improve cooperation between law enforcement and the 
community). 
 261. 20 U.S.C.A. § 7133(a). 
VAINIK_3FMT 4/16/2007 8:53:54 AM 
1148 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1111 
 
Also, just as Congress suggested in the COPS Program 
that federal funds be used for “innovative programs to increase 
and enhance proactive crime control and prevention programs 
involving law enforcement officers and young people,”262 the 
VAWA amendment would state that the grant be used to estab-
lish gun units to proactively remove and retain guns. To ac-
complish this task, the VAWA grant would, like the COPS pro-
gram, provide funds “to hire additional community policing 
officers and civilian personnel to investigate” persons who must 
be disarmed. 
3. Conditioning Federal Funds to Accomplish These Goals 
Satisfies the Dole Test 
A program that provides grants to states that adopt the 
federal gun bans and create gun units is constitutional under 
Dole. In Dole, Chief Justice Rehnquist advocated a five-part 
test to determine the constitutionality of Congress’s use of its 
spending power.263 This test requires that (1) the exercise of the 
spending power is in the pursuit of the “general welfare”; (2) 
Congress clearly states the conditions imposed on the funds; (3) 
a germane connection exists between the funds and the federal 
interest in the particular national program; (4) no independent 
constitutional bar impedes the distribution of federal funds; 
and (5) federal authorities do not coercively garner the states’ 
compliance.264 
According to Dole, the courts should “defer substantially to 
the judgment of Congress” in determining whether federal 
funding satisfies the “general welfare” requirement.265 Given 
this undemanding standard of review, Congress could easily 
argue that disarming batterers promotes the public good. Re-
moving guns helps to save the lives of intimate partners and 
keeps family and innocent bystanders safe. The grants would 
also deter costs which would otherwise tax the public purse, 
such as victims’ use of  emergency health care services.266 The 
 
 262. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3796dd(b)(12). 
 263. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08, 211 (1987). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 207. 
 266. See PAULA WEBER, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, A REPORT OF THE 
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 
PREVENTION 3–4 (2005) (reporting that the health-related costs of intimate-
partner violence exceed $5.8 billion per year in the United States, of which 
nearly $4.1 billion are direct medical and mental health care services and $1.8 
billion are productivity losses).  
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program would enhance judicial efficiency because women 
would not need to go to court frequently to ensure that state 
authorities take away their abusers’ guns. Reducing the num-
ber of armed batterers may also reduce the number of domestic 
calls to which police officers respond because fewer women 
would be threatened with guns. This sampling of the numerous 
public benefits of federal grants shows that Congress would 
likely satisfy the “general welfare” requirement. 
The federal grants would also fulfill the second require-
ment of a “clear statement.” Congress would simply need to 
state unambiguously that the distribution of the grants is con-
ditioned on states’ fulfillment of the specified requirements.267 
Because Congress has successfully outlined the conditions of its 
grants before, as in the Hate Crimes Prevention Program and 
the COPS Program,268 Congress should also be able to provide a 
clear statement in the case at hand. 
A “germane” connection between the funds and the federal 
program could also be proved. The Hate Crimes Prevention 
Program links funding for training and education improve-
ments to the goal of deterring hate crimes,269 and the COPS 
Program links funds for increased police presence to the goal of 
improving police/community relations.270 Similarly, Congress 
could link the proposed grant program to the federal goal of 
protecting women from gun violence. Because courts use the ra-
tional basis standard to review the existence of a “germane 
connection,”271 Congress would likely pass this requirement. 
It is unlikely that an independent constitutional bar would 
prohibit the use of federal funds to compel the states to enact 
the gun bans and establish gun units. Opponents might claim a 
violation of the Second and Tenth Amendments. However, 
courts have already stated that the federal gun bans do not vio-
late the Second Amendment.272 In addition, Dole clearly noted 
that the Tenth Amendment does not limit the use of conditional 
 
 267. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
 268. See 20 U.S.C. § 7133 (Supp. IV 2001–2006); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3796dd to 
3796dd-8 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
 269. 20 U.S.C. § 7133. 
 270. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3796dd(a). 
 271. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 (“[It is sufficient that] Congress conditioned 
the receipt of federal funds in a way reasonably calculated to address th[e] 
particular impediment to a purpose for which the funds are expended.” (em-
phasis added)). 
 272. See United States v. Jackubowski, 63 F. App’x 959, 961 (7th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 224–25 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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federal funds.273 Dole also cautioned that the grants must not 
incite invidious discrimination or cruel and unusual punish-
ment.274 However, the proposed grant program is unlikely to 
create such problems because the gun bans apply to everyone 
and gun owners may retrieve their guns once their order for 
protection terminates or their record is expunged.275 Further-
more, Congress could avoid coercing the states to change their 
laws by exercising only the “mild encouragement” that Dole 
sanctions.276 Congress should ensure that the amount of money 
conditioned on the states’ adoption of the federal gun bans and 
creation of gun units is not so substantial as to leave the states 
with no choice but to follow Congress’s directive.277 
B. CONGRESS SHOULD ESTABLISH STATE REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS 
To effectuate the work of the gun units, Congress should 
impose reporting requirements on state and local authorities. 
In Printz, Justice O’Connor stated that Congress may constitu-
tionally mandate states to report information to the federal 
government, for example.278 O’Connor specified that federal 
laws that require local law enforcement agencies to report cases 
of missing children to the DOJ remain constitutional.279 Con-
gress should assert the power it retained under Printz by re-
quiring states to report domestic violence misdemeanants and 
persons subject to orders for protection to the DOJ. 
Access to information about the number of domestic vio-
lence misdemeanor convictions and state-issued orders for pro-
tection would enable Congress to distribute the proposed grants 
appropriately. To establish a reporting requirement, Congress 
could look to the Hate Crimes Statistic Act (HCSA) of 1990280 
as a model. The HCSA requires the DOJ to obtain data from lo-
 
 273. 483 U.S. at 210. 
 274. Id. at 210–11. 
 275. See May, supra note 24, at 9 (recognizing that batterers are “not a pro-
tected group” and that courts have found that batterers who lose their em-
ployment as a result of the firearm bans have no legally cognizable defense to 
remedy this consequence). 
 276. 483 U.S. at 211. 
 277. See id. 
 278. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2000)). 
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cal law enforcement agencies concerning incidents of hate 
crimes.281 An amendment to VAWA would impose a similar re-
porting requirement on state law enforcement agencies for do-
mestic violence. Like the HCSA, the VAWA amendment would 
instruct the DOJ to publish an annual summary of its find-
ings.282 Congress could access this information to strategically 
appropriate grant money to areas where instances of abuse are 
high. 
Reporting requirements would also help local gun units 
apprehend and disarm batterers. For instance, Congress could 
stipulate that states accept the grants on the condition that 
court personnel promptly enroll prohibited persons in the Na-
tional Instant Check System (NICS).283 NICS is an electronic 
database established as part of the Brady Act in 1998.284 Fed-
erally licensed gun dealers must use NICS to conduct criminal 
background checks on all firearm purchasers.285 Currently, 
many states do not enter their protective orders in the NICS 
system.286 By compelling states to report information about 
abusers, disarmament would be more likely because abusers’ 
domestic violence records would prevent them from purchasing 
a gun.287 
In addition, Congress could stipulate that grant recipients 
 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Cf. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(IX)(b) (Supp. 2006) (“The adminis-
trative office of the courts shall enter information regarding the protective or-
ders into the state database which shall be made available to police and sheriff 
departments statewide.”); Sack, supra note 35, at 20 (stating that New York 
law requires courts to notify the statewide registry of protection orders); 
BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 6 (noting that California courts have pro-
vided information on almost one quarter of a million restraining orders to the 
NICS system). 
 284. See Brady Campaign, Gun Laws Work, Loopholes Don’t, http://www 
.bradycampaign.org/facts/issues/?page=loop (last visited Jan. 28, 2007). NICS 
draws on information entered in the National Crime Information Center data-
base (NCIC). BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 3. 
 285. See Karan & Stampalia, supra note 35, at 81 (describing how firearm 
dealers in Florida must conduct background checks on NCIC); BRADY CAM-
PAIGN, supra note 139, at 9. 
 286. See BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 3 (stating that in June 2003, 
the NCIC registery of protective orders contained only 781,574 entries, esti-
mated to be less than half of the over two million protective orders that qualify 
for entry). 
 287. See id. California and a few other states already provide information 
on restraining orders to NICS. See id. at 6. In 2001, however, only eleven per-
cent of the sixty-four million state criminal history records available nation-
wide were instantly accessible through NICS. Id. at 7. 
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report state firearm license records.288 An investigator could 
then look at the license records to determine if an individual 
has a prior record of gun acquisition.289 The investigator would 
compare this report to the individual’s NICS entry,290 identify 
prohibited persons who are likely to own firearms, and catch 
defendants who falsely testify that they do not own guns. Ac-
cess to license records would also help identify prohibited per-
sons who purchase guns from private gun dealers. These deal-
ers are not legally required to conduct an NICS background 
check.291 An investigator’s knowledge of an individual’s gun li-
cense may raise a red flag, prompting the investigator to find 
out if the person does own a gun illegally. Creating incentives 
for states to report this information will help gun units close 
the gaps that permit batterers to remain armed. 
C. THE BENEFITS OF PROVIDING FEDERAL INCENTIVES FOR THE 
STATES TO DISARM BATTERERS 
While the proposed federal grant program may not provide 
a foolproof solution for protecting women from gun violence, it 
would substantially improve current approaches to disarming 
batterers. Under this solution, the combined use of federal and 
state law would avoid the problems of the state sovereignty 
paradigm while preserving important elements of federalism 
doctrine. Enticing the states to adopt federal law as a minimum 
requirement would rebut the presumption that domestic vio-
lence is a private matter not worthy of national attention.292 
Congress would preserve its historic role in regulating domestic 
relations by promoting a federal grant program that establishes 
a uniform, nationwide requirement for disarming batterers. 
This solution would also preserve a role for state governments 
as laboratories,293 giving states freedom to devise creative pol-
 
 288. See id. at 8. 
 289. Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12010(a) (West. Supp. 2007) (“The Attorney 
General shall establish and maintain an online database to be known as the 
Prohibited Armed Persons File. The purpose of the file is to cross-reference 
persons who have ownership or possession of a firearm . . . as indicated by a 
record in the Consolidated Firearms Information System, and who, subse-
quent to the date of that ownership or possession of a firearm, fall within a 
class of persons who are prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm.”). 
 290. See BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 8. 
 291. Id. at 9. 
 292. See Legal Responses, supra note 194, at 1543. 
 293. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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icy solutions to address gun violence against women, provided 
they do not fall below the minimum requirement. 
The federal grants would also diminish the likelihood that 
judicial and prosecutorial discretion could obfuscate the pur-
pose of the gun bans. By stipulating that judges follow a stan-
dard disarmament process, the grants would better enable vic-
tim advocates and counsel to discover when a judge strays from 
the guidelines. The creation of citizen watchdog groups could 
increase public oversight of judicial decisions. Prosecutors 
might continue to seek plea deals with defendants to avoid go-
ing to trial, but the public’s increased courtroom observation 
could stir negative publicity over a local prosecutor’s habit of 
cutting deals with defendants. As a result, the public may re-
fuse to reelect state or county attorneys. In the face of losing 
their elected offices, state or county attorneys may reform 
prosecutors’ practices by limiting a prosecutor’s ability to make 
plea deals or by requiring that plea deals include an order to 
disarm. 
Additionally, the creation of state gun units would estab-
lish the physical and bureaucratic infrastructure necessary to 
remove the guns. If states had the resources to disarm batter-
ers, many batterers would voluntarily disarm in the face of the 
real possibility that a State may force them to do so. Even if an 
individual refused to comply, the improved ability of investiga-
tors to access data identifying prohibited persons and their 
guns would increase disarmament. 
If the disarmament system failed or became inadequate, 
the public would be more likely to hold state and federal legis-
lators accountable. If a state enacted the federal gun bans as its 
own law, it would be less likely to blame Congress for improper 
enforcement since this duty would be its own. The reporting re-
quirements would increase public awareness of states that do 
not confiscate guns at the same rate as other jurisdictions. 
Constituents could use such data to rally federal legislators to 
offer greater assistance to those states, thereby holding Con-
gress responsible for enforcing a uniform nationwide standard. 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of this solution must be 
judged from the perspective of battered women. To do so, it is 
worth considering how such a solution could have changed Teri 
Lee’s life.294 While the tragic circumstances surrounding the 
Lee family may be attributed to a myriad of failed social and 
 
 294. See supra text accompanying notes 1–21. 
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government interventions, it is nevertheless important to ask, 
Would Teri Lee be alive today had Van Keuren been disarmed? 
If Minnesota had adopted the federal gun bans and created 
gun units, the Lee case could have unfolded differently. Once 
the judge issued the criminal no contact order against Van 
Keuren, immediate steps would have been taken to disarm 
him. The judge would have asked whether Van Keuren owned a 
gun, informing both him and Teri Lee that he could no longer 
possess one under state and federal law. As a condition of his 
release, the judge would have required Van Keuren to give up 
his firearms at a local gun repository within forty-eight hours. 
A victim advocate would have met with Teri Lee to determine 
ways to keep her and her family safe, perhaps by staying at a 
battered women’s shelter. If Van Keuren had not complied with 
the order, officers in the local gun unit would have been noti-
fied immediately. The officers then could have arrested and dis-
armed Van Keuren. Any one of these interventions could have 
resulted in Van Keuren’s disarmament. By giving Teri Lee the 
full support of state judicial and law enforcement bodies, Teri 
Lee would not have had to defend herself and her children 
alone.  
  CONCLUSION   
In light of the violence women continue to face, the federal 
government’s recent efforts to assume responsibility for domes-
tic violence should be supported. However, the public must 
critically analyze current approaches to gun violence to assure 
the best solution. Most importantly, the public must hold Con-
gress accountable for the legislature’s misguided habit of acqui-
escing to states’ presumed sovereignty over domestic relations. 
To end the alarming amount of violence faced by women across 
the country, Congress must influence local action to the maxi-
mum of its constitutional ability. By providing monetary incen-
tives to the states to adopt the federal gun bans, create gun 
units, and follow reporting requirements, Congress can effec-
tively establish a uniform, national approach to combating do-
mestic violence. This approach would recognize the federal gov-
ernment’s unique capacity to provide a national solution and 
would affirm the importance of enabling women to live free 
from violence. 
